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OLIARI AND THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
WHERE THE COURT FAILED 
Vito John Marzano* 
ABSTRACT 
The European Court of Human Rights revisited the issue 
of legal recognition for same-sex partnerships on July 21, 2015 
when it decided Oliari and Others v. Italy. This Note explores 
the implications of that decision and what it may mean for same-
sex couples within Italy and throughout the Council of Europe.  
Through a careful analysis of the decision, this Note concludes 
that Oliari provides slight yet important movement on the issue 
of a Contracting State’s obligation to afford legal recognition for 
same-sex partnerships, but a practical implementation of the 
Court’s holding likely will yield little additional movement in 
more conservative Contracting States, as the factors utilized to 
find a violation on the part of Italy remain highly unique to the 
Italian experience, rendering any perception of a victory as 
merely psychological in nature.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On July 21, 2016, the Fourth Section of the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”)1 issued its decision in Oliari 
and Others v. Italy,2 holding that while Italy had a positive 
obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR,” the “Convention”) to offer same-sex couples civil 
unions, or some type of partnership recognition, the Convention 
did not require Contracting States to recognize same-sex 
marriage.3   
The decision held that it remains within a Contracting 
State’s margin of appreciation to deny marriage to same-sex 
couples.4 Importantly, however, the Fourth Section expanded 
the factors that may be considered for the ECtHR to place a 
positive obligation on a Contracting State to provide some legal 
partnership recognition.5   
In Part I, this Note develops the Court’s application and 
interpretation of the Convention in regards to LGBT rights.6 
Further, Part I analyzes Schalk and Kopf v. Austria7 and 
                                                          
1 The European Court of Human Rights is composed of five sections, that 
each include a President, Vice President, and judges. Further, the ECtHR 
divides itself up into judicial formations, which are: Single Judge, Committee, 
Chamber, and Grand Chamber. International Justice Resource Center, 
European Court of Human Rights, http://www.ijrcenter.org/european-court-of-
human-rights/ (last visited Feb 1, 2017). When possible, this Note identifies 
the judicial formation that issued a particular decision. 
2 Oliari and Others v. Italy, App. Nos. 18766/11 & 36030/11, Eur. Ct. 
H.R., (July 21, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-156265. 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6  As this Note explains, an opposite-gender couple consisting of a male 
and a female, regardless if one of those partners is a trans-man or trans-
woman, are entitled to State-recognized marriage provided that post-
transition, the couple consists of two individuals of the opposite gender. 
Instances where a couple is made up of a transgender individual but the 
transgender individual is the same gender as the other spouse fall within the 
scope of same-sex partnerships. To avoid confusion, this Note uses “LGB” in 
lieu of “LGBT” when appropriate. This usage does not seek to undermine the 
position of transgender individuals in the LGBT community-at-large.   
7 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409. 
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Vallianatos and others v. Greece,8 which established the 
foundation for Oliari.  
Part II explores Oliari and Others v. Italy’s use of margin 
of appreciation, consensus analysis, and the living instrument 
document.  In so doing, Part II seeks to pinpoint potential 
movement by the Court on the issue of same-sex partnerships. 
Part III addresses post-Oliari developments.  
This Note draws the following conclusions: (1) the Court 
is likely not to find a right to marry for same-sex couples in the 
foreseeable future; (2) although the Court found that Italy had a 
positive obligation to provide same-sex couples with partnership 
benefits, the decision is extremely narrow and likely only applies 
to the Italian circumstance; and (3) the holding failed to identify 
what that State is actually required to offer same-sex couples in 
the event it must offer same-sex partnership recognition.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Within the Council of Europe, same-sex couples enjoy the 
right to marry in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (England, Wales, and 
Scotland).9 Same-sex couples may enter into civil partnerships 
(e.g., civil unions, domestic partnerships, unregistered 
partnership benefits, or any variation thereof) in Andorra, 
Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malta, Northern Ireland, Slovenia, and 
Switzerland.10 Outside of the Council of Europe, same-sex 
couples enjoy the right to marry, in whole or in part, in 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Greenland, Mexico, New 
Zealand, South Africa, Uruguay, and the United States.11 
                                                          
8 Vallianatos and others v. Greece, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H. R. 125. 
9 See Michael Lipka, Where Europe Stands on Gay Marriage and Civil 
Unions, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 9, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org /fact-
tank/2015/06/09/where-europe-stands-on-gay-marriage-and-civil-unions/.  
10 See id. 
11 Amarendra Bhushan Dhiraj, List of Countries Where Same-Sex 
Marriage Is Legal, CEOWORLD MAGAZINE (Apr. 10, 2016), http://ceoworld.biz/ 
2015/11/23/list-of-countries-where-same-sex-marriage-is-legal; Colombia’s 
highest court paves way for same-sex marriage, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 8, 2016, 9:24 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
VITO J MARZANO - OLIARI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2017  2:27 PM 
254 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 29:1 
Finally, Chile and Ecuador provide same-sex couples with civil 
unions.12  
a. Procedures and Functions of the 
European Court of Human Rights  
 
The European Court of Human Rights employs some 
procedures that may seem alien to a U.S.-based audience. To 
better understand the decision in Oliari, one must possess a 
preliminary understanding of some of these doctrines.  
First, it is important to consider that the European Court 
of Human Rights exists pursuant to Article 19 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights as an international tribunal for 
the purpose of interpreting the Convention.13 While the Court 
may look to domestic courts for insight, it must confine its 
holdings to the limitations set forth in the Convention and 
within the scope of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.14 Nevertheless, although the Convention speaks to the 
procedure for a private party to challenge a contracting State’s 
                                                          
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/08/colombias-highest-court-
paves-way-for-same-sex-marriage/.  
12 Chile’s same-sex couples celebrate civil unions: ‘History changes today’, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2015, 1:46 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2015/oct/22/chiles-same-sex-couples-celebrate-civil-unions; Michael K. 
Lavers, Ecuadorian lawmakers approve civil unions bill, WASHINGTON BLADE 
(Apr. 23, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/04/23/ 
ecuadorian-lawmakers-approve-civil-unions-bill/.  
13 European Convention on Human Rights as amended by Protocols Nos. 
11 and 14 art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter “ECHR”]. 
14 European Court of Human Rights, Bringing a Case to the European 
Court of Human Rights: A Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, ¶ 382 
(2014) (“Despite its distinctive nature, the Convention remains an 
international treaty which obeys the same rules as other inter-State treaties, 
in particular those laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
The Court cannot therefore overstep the boundaries of the general powers 
which the Contracting States, of their sovereign will, have delegated to it.”) 
[hereinafter “Bringing a Case”]. The source of authority plays a key role in the 
inherent difference between the ECtHR and national tribunals, such as the 
Supreme Court of the United States, which derives its authority from Article 
III of the U.S. Constitution. Nevertheless, while the ECtHR must adhere to a 
different set of standards when it interprets the Convention, certain doctrines 
have evolved that share analogous counterparts to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
When possible, this Note identifies those analogous doctrines or practices to 
U.S. counterparts.    
5
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action (or inaction), the Court has developed extensive 
jurisprudence in regards to the application of that procedure. As 
this Note demonstrates, the Court’s application of that 
procedure can directly impact the interpretation of its holding.  
Article 34 of the Convention permits an individual 
applicant to bring a claim against a Contracting State for alleged 
violations of the Convention, but Article 35 governs the initial 
procedural step, which requires the applicant to overcome the 
hurdle of admissibility.15 However, to determine admissibility, 
the Court must conduct a prima facie examination of the merits, 
and, in so doing, will generally provide reasoning as to why it 
may find an application “manifestly ill-founded,” and therefore, 
inadmissible.16 As explored below, that evolution of the Court’s 
reasoning on admissibility as it concerns the rights of lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals (“LGBT”) under the 
Convention furnishes one with insight on how the Court may 
rule on subsequent applications.  
Once an application clears the procedural aspect of 
Article 35, the application must then undergo a thorough 
examination of the claims and determine whether the 
Contracting State did indeed violate, and the extent to which the 
State may continue to violate, an enumerated right of the 
                                                          
15 ECHR, supra note 13, art. 34 (“The Court may receive applications 
from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties 
of the rights set forth in the Convention or Protocols thereto. The High 
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise 
of this right.”); Id. art. 35 (requiring the Court to dismiss any application that 
failed to exhaust all domestic remedies, is incompatible with a provision, or 
that is manifestly ill-founded). 
16 Id. art. 35(3)(a); BRINGING A CASE, supra note 14, ¶375 (“It is true that 
the use of the term “manifestly” … may cause confusion … [I]t is clear from the 
settled and abundant case-law of the Convention institutions … that the 
expression is to be construed more broadly, in terms of the final outcome of the 
case. [A]ny application will be considered ‘manifestly ill-founded’ if a 
preliminary examination of its substance does not disclose any appearance of 
a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention.”). Put another way, 
manifestly ill-founded may indicate a prima facie declaration that the case is 
inadmissible, the Court’s broad method requires it to look beyond the four 
corners of the application to the ultimate outcome to determine its 
admissibility. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
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ECHR.17 Hence, the Court measures a Contracting State’s 
“margin of appreciation,” or the spectrum upon which a State 
may interfere with an individual’s right.18 To aid in its 
determination, the ECtHR must undertake a consensus 
analysis, which requires the Court to identify a crystalized 
consensus among the Contracting States on the issue.19 Further, 
                                                          
17 Bringing a Case, supra note 14, ¶ 367 (To determine if a State has 
made a permissible interference into the rights enumerated in the Convention, 
the Court requires the State to affirmatively meet three criteria: “(1) Was the 
interference in accordance with a “law” that was sufficiently accessible and 
foreseeable; (2) If so, did it pursue at least one of the “legitimate aims” which 
are exhaustively enumerated; and (3) if that is the case, was the interference 
“necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve that aim? In other 
words, was there a relationship of proportionality between the aim and the 
restriction in issue?”).  
18 See Id. ¶ 335; see also PAUL JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 69 (2013) (to determine the margin of 
appreciation, the Court examines the legality, legitimacy, and necessity of the 
restriction relative to the personal interest of the applicant) (hereinafter 
“HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT”); PHILIP LEACH, TAKE A CASE TO 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 5.11 (2011) (stating that the specific 
issue before the Court will influence the breadth of a State’s margin of 
appreciation, and that in contentious controversies, a State enjoys a broad 
latitude to interfere with the personal interest) [hereinafter “TAKING A CASE”]; 
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT, at 68 (identifying that this 
inherently presents one with no clear outline as to how wide or narrow a State’s 
margin of appreciation is, as the Court, in many instances, provides little legal 
justification for its reasoning); Id. at 69-70 (stating that some argue that this 
indicates that the margin of appreciation provides insight into the moral 
compass of the Court). One can analogize the concept of margin of appreciation 
to the U.S. application of judicial review. For instance, strict scrutiny requires 
the government to have a compelling interest to regulate the behavior, that the 
law is narrowly tailored, and it is the least restrictive means to achieve that 
result. Bret Snider, Challenging Laws: 3 Levels of Scrutiny Explained, 
FINDLAW (Jan. 27. 2014, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2014/ 
01/challenging-laws-3-levels-of-scrutiny-explained.html. While the means may 
differ between the U.S. Courts and the ECtHR, the goal is the same – to 
determine the extent to which the government may interfere in an individual’s 
respective rights. I did not feel it necessary to reinvent the wheel in my 
exploration of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as related to LGBT rights, hence 
I rely heavily on the thoroughly researched and readily available book by Paul 
Johnson, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.  
19 HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT, supra note 18, at 77 
(stating that the Court will look to legal development among contracting 
States, expert opinions, public opinion both within the individual States and 
across the Council of Europe). But see id. at 77–78 ("Consensus analysis is a 
7
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the Court adheres to the living instrument interpretation within 
the framework of contemporary circumstances, which means 
that the vicissitudes of an issue permit an updated 
interpretation of the Convention.20 In instances where a 
Contracting State acts outside its margin of appreciation as 
identified by the ECtHR, a contracting State must modify the 
law to adhere to the Court’s determination and cease offending 
that particular right. However, in some instances, the failure to 
affirmatively act to protect a right may constitute a violation of 
the ECHR, which will require the ECtHR to place a positive 
obligation on the Contracting State to act to prevent further 
interference.21 
                                                          
construct through which the Court legitimizes its moral interpretation and 
because of this, … its use is unpredictable and variable. The Court's case law 
on homosexuality shows a highly capricious and frequently contested use of 
statutory, expert, and public consensus analysis… [T]he use … varies to such 
an extent that it cannot be regarded as causally determinative of the margin 
in any straightforward way."). The Supreme Court of the United States has 
not specifically identified this doctrine, but has undertaken similar analyses. 
See e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (noting that twenty-four 
states had anti-sodomy laws and using that rationale as a factor in upholding 
the constitutionality of said laws); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) 
(acknowledging that the number of states that maintained anti-sodomy laws 
since Bowers had dwindled to thirteen, with only four enforcing them solely 
against homosexuals and finding those remaining laws unconstitutional); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1967) (noting that Virginia was only one of 
sixteen states that still maintained miscegenation laws at the time of the suit) 
for instances where the Supreme Court of the United States utilized a 
consensus analysis. The ECtHR does not exist in a vacuum and will often look 
to the reasoning and holding of non-Convention tribunals to inform it of 
international movement on a particular issue.  
20 TAKING A CASE, supra note 18, at § 5.13 ("[T]he role of the Court is to 
interpret the Convention in the light of present day conditions and situations, 
rather than to try to assess what was intended by the original drafts of the 
Convention in the late 1940s."). This does not mean that the Court ignores its 
previous decisions; it only means that when the Court deems it appropriate, it 
will reinterpret previous standards.  
21 See generally LEACH, TAKING A CASE, supra note 18, at § 6.351 (“The 
state’s primary obligation under Article 8 is negative, that is, not to interfere 
with those rights. However, in certain circumstances, the Article imposes 
positive obligations, that is, a duty to take appropriate steps to ensure 
protection of the rights in question. It is well established that positive 
obligations are inherent in the concept of the right to ‘respect’ for private life 
under Article 8 … [I]n order to determine whether or not a positive obligation 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
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a. A General Background on the Movement 
of the Court 
 
From its inception, the ECtHR received numerous 
individual applications that challenged laws that banned 
homosexual conduct, but declared virtually all of those 
complaints manifestly ill-founded (i.e., inadmissible).22 This 
period shaped the manner in which the Court addressed cases 
that sought redress for state interference into the lives of gay 
men. Paul Johnson identified W.B. v. Federal Republic of 
Germany23 as the first case concerning homosexuality to be 
confronted by the ECHR.24  He pointed out that the Commission 
held that “the Convention permits a High Contracting Party to 
legislate homosexuality as a punishable offense.”25 Notably, 
while applicants brought their claim under Articles 2, 8, 14, 17, 
and 18 of the Convention,26 the Commission focused its early 
decision on the right to private life found in Article 8,27 thus 
indicating the proper avenue for future cases to be brought. 
Nevertheless, these early cases permitted the ECtHR to 
circumvent the issue by relying on the issue of admissibility.28  
                                                          
exists, the Court will assess the fair balance between the general interests of 
the community and the interests of the individual.”).   
22 JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 19–34 
(collecting cases).   
23 W.B. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 104/55, 1955-57 Y.B. 
Eur. Conv. Hum. Rts. 228 (Eur. Comm’n H.R.).   
24 JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 23.  
25 Id., quoting W.B. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 104/55, 
1955-57 Y.B. Eur. Conv. Hum. Rts. 228 (Eur. Comm’n H.R.).  
26 ECHR, supra note 13, art. 2 (Right to Life), art. 8 (Right to respect for 
private and family life); art. 14 (Prohibition of discrimination); art. 17 
(Prohibition of abuse of rights); art. 18 (Limitation on use of restrictions on 
rights). 
27 HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 24 (recognizing that 
although the Commission upheld paragraph 175, by classifying the law as one 
that interferes with Article 8’s private life clause, it laid the foundation for 
future applicants to concentrate their challenges on this provision).; see also 
W.B. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No 104/55, 1955-57 Y.B. Eur. Conv. 
Hum. Rts. 228 (Eur. Comm’n H.R.) (finding that West Germany’s paragraph 
175, which made sexual conduct between two men illegal, did not violate the 
Convention); see also JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, 
at 97.  
28 JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 37. 
9
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In 1977, the Commission first declared an application 
that challenged anti-LGB laws admissible in X v. United 
Kingdom.29 Although this provided progress, the Commission’s 
decision was obscure, which some have argued was likely due to 
the ECtHR’s transition from formative to judicial.30 Put another 
way, the ECtHR’s concern with legitimacy ultimately indicated 
its willingness to set aside important progress on the rights of 
an unpopular minority as to not undermine its legitimacy with 
Contracting States; in that spirit, the ECtHR obfuscated this 
concern through the use of its consensus analysis doctrine. 
Nevertheless, the early seminal case for LGB individuals 
came in 1981, when the Grand Chamber decided Dudgeon v. the 
United Kingdom.31 There, the Grand Chamber held that 
Northern Ireland’s anti-sodomy law violated the right to privacy 
of homosexual men enumerated in Article 8 of the ECHR.32 
Importantly, Dudgeon provides two key takeaways for LGB 
activists: (1) an expansive reading of “private life” unblocks an 
avenue for LGBT individuals to seek redress from the ECtHR;33 
and (2) the Court views homosexuality as “a private 
manifestation of the human personality.”34  
In 1986, the Court decided Rees v. United Kingdom, 
where it held that the right to marry provision enumerated in 
Article 12 requires a biological consideration, and therefore 
could not be extended to instances where a spouse has 
                                                          
29  X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7215/75, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. Commission (1977).  
30 JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 37 
(reasoning that, although the ECtHR was obscure in its decision, it most likely 
acted due to its transition from a ‘formative’ court to a ‘judicial’ judicial). 
31 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. 149 (1981). 
32 Id. ¶ 63. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. ¶ 60. Gary Johnson argues the Court’s established its ontological 
definition of homosexuality, and this approach continues to serve as the 
foundation of how the Court still views homosexuals. See JOHNSON, 
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 50, (“Central to the Court’s 
recognition that the criminalization of private, homosexual acts constitutes a 
violation of Article 8 was the idea that the applicant’s ‘personal circumstances’ 
and his ‘tendencies’ predisposed him towards particular sexual acts. In this 
sense, acknowledging the congenital nature of the applicant’s sexual 
orientation was foundation to accepting his status as a victim of criminal 
law.”). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
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transitioned from one gender to the other, resulting in a male-
female relationship.35 The Court upheld this interpretation but 
provided insight into what it may look for in subsequent cases 
that would permit it to revisit the issue, as demonstrated in 
Cossey v. the United Kingdom in 1990.36 Applying its consensus-
analysis doctrine, it held that a consensus had yet to emerge 
among contracting States that altered the biological aspect of 
Article 12 and would allow the ECtHR to impose a new 
standard.37   
Twelve years after Cossey, the Grand Chamber reversed 
and held that European and international trends moved 
sufficiently in the direction of recognizing legal status for 
transgender individuals to receive legal recognition of their 
proper gender, and thus required the removal of the biological 
aspect of gender within the meaning of Article 12.38 Like 
Dudgeon, Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom provided 
further insight into the factors necessary for subsequent 
progress. The Grand Chamber found that although Article 12 is 
the only article that identifies “men” and “women” by gender, it 
could not “still be assumed that these terms must refer to the 
determination of gender by purely biological criteria.”39 Looking 
at societal transitions, it held that “there have been major social 
changes in the institution of marriage … as well as dramatic 
changes brought about by the developments in medicine and 
science in the field of transsexuality.”40 To aid its decision, the 
Grand Chamber reasoned that the Council of Europe does not 
exist in a vacuum, permitting the Grand Chamber to look to 
                                                          
35 Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, ¶ 49 (1986) (“In the 
Court’s opinion, the right to marry guaranteed by Article 12 refers to the 
traditional marriage between persons of opposite biological sex.”); ECHR, 
supra note 2, art. 12 (“Right to marry – Men and women of marriageable age 
have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws 
governing the exercise of this right.”). The use of the word “transsexual” 
reflects the terminology used in the decision.  
36 Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5, ¶ 46 (1990) (“[T]he 
developments which have occurred ... cannot be said to evidence any general 
abandonment of the traditional concept of marriage.”). 
37 Id.  
38 Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
39 Id. ¶ 100.  
40 Id.  
11
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broader international movement on the topic.41 This expansive 
consensus analysis provided the push required to apply the 
living instrument doctrine and, relying on the social, cultural, 
and legal context of that time, reinterpret Article 12 in the light 
of the then-contemporary understanding of gender.42  
The Court has also progressed on the issue of family life. 
Article 8 of the Convention enumerates two important rights: 
the right to privacy and the right to family life.43 The Court 
steadfastly refrained from an expansive interpretation of family 
life, which left only Article 8’s private life as the avenue for 
applicants to challenge anti-LGB laws. The ECtHR first 
addressed family life as it relates directly to same-sex couples in 
1983, when it deemed an application inadmissible because of the 
biological aspect of Article 12, and that no consensus had 
emerged among contracting States to alter this definition.44 For 
example, in Mata Estevez v. Spain, the applicant shared a home, 
expenses, and his private life with his partner for a number of 
                                                          
41 Id. ¶ 84.   
42 See JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 84–
85 (evaluating the living document approach the Court has taken regarding 
the ECHR when it first identified the “dynamic and evolutive” approach in 
Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978)).  
43 ECHR, supra note 2, 13, § I, art. 8 
44 See X and Y v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9369/8, 32 Eur. Comm’n. 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 220 (1983) (holding that although the child ‘Z’ was a British 
national, no tangible ill-effect is had on the child if X is not listed as its father 
on the birth certificate); id. ¶ 44 (“The Court observes that there is no common 
European standard with regard to granting parental rights to transsexuals. In 
addition, it has not been established before the Court that there exists any 
generally shared approach among the High Contracting Parties with regard to 
the manner in which the social relationship between a child conceived by the 
AID and the person who performs the role of father should be reflected in law. 
Indeed, according to the information available to the Court, although the 
technology of medically assisted procreation has been available in Europe for 
several decades, many of the issues to which it gives rise ... remain the subject 
of debate. For example, there is no consensus amongst the member States ... 
on the question whether the interests of a child conceived in such a way are 
best served by preserving the anonymity of the donor of the sperm or whether 
the child should have the right to know the donor’s identity. Such the issues in 
the case, therefore, touch on areas where there is little common ground 
amongst member States ... and ... the law appears to be in a transitional stage, 
the respondent State must be afforded a wide margin of appreciation...”).  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
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years.45 However, the Court refused to qualify their relationship 
as one of the drafters of the ECHR contemplated when they 
included family life in Article 8.46 But it noted that Article 8 in 
conjunction with Article 14 may rise to the level of 
discrimination, indicating the Court’s willingness to expand 
family life to include same-sex couples.47 Nevertheless, the Court 
punted and held that marriage constitutes an essential 
precondition for eligibility for a survivor’s pension; hence, the 
discrimination suffered had reasonable justification.48  
Two years after Mata Estevez, the ECtHR reversed its 
holding and expanded family life to include same-sex couples. In 
Karner v. Austria, the application challenged an Austrian law 
that afforded the right of an unmarried partner to inherit the 
tenancy of an apartment but failed to encompass homosexuals; 
the First Section found this violated Article 8 in conjunction with 
Article 14 because Austria did not show the necessity of 
discriminating against same-sex partnerships.49 The Fourth 
Section applied similar reasoning in Kozak v. Poland, when it 
held that Poland’s exclusion of same-sex couples from a law that 
provided tenancy succession for de facto marital cohabitation 
was discriminatory.50  
The issue of same-sex marriage presented itself once 
more to the ECtHR in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria.51 There, the 
First Section identified the lack of developed consensus among 
                                                          
45 Mata Estevez v. Spain, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 320–21.  
46 Id. at 321 (holding private life as understood by Article 8 does not 
guarantee access for the surviving partner of a same-sex couple to a deceased 
partner’s pension regardless of the emotional and sexual relationship).  
47 Id. at 321; ECHR, supra, note 2, art. 14 (“Prohibition of discrimination 
– the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall 
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”). 
48 See Mata Estevez, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 314. 
49 Karner v. Austria, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H. R. 199, ¶ 37 (“The Court 
reiterates that ... a difference in treatment is discriminatory if it has no 
objective and reasonable justification.”). 
50 Kozak v. Poland, App. No. 13102/02, 2010 Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶¶ 92–99. 
51 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409.  
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European States to expand marriage to same-sex couples.52 
Further, it noted the difference in terms: Article 12 genders the 
right with its use of “men and women,” but the use of “everyone” 
found in Article 8 meant that gender was not a consideration for 
the rights enumerated in that article.53 Schalk unshackled 
“family life” under Article 8 by removing the gendered 
constraints previously affixed, even though it inflexibly adhered 
to those same constraints in regards to the right to marriage 
under Article 12. Nevertheless, this expansive reading of Article 
8 brought the issue to light with Kozak.  
Thus, the ECtHR evolved substantially from Dudgeon in 
1981 to Schalk in 2010. Nevertheless, even as the ECtHR 
continued to slowly move on the issue, same-sex couples began 
to see their rights vindicated as more countries began to provide 
legal partnership recognition either through alternative 
schemes such as civil unions or by ending state sponsored 
discrimination by expanding marriage.  
 
a. Schalk and Vallianatos – What 
Did the ECtHR Say?  
 
Schalk laid the foundation upon which the ECtHR built 
Vallianatos and Oliari. Vallianatos applied that criteria set 
forth in Schalk and produced a favorable decision for same-sex 
couples, and Oliari builds upon Vallianatos with its expansive 
application of “State movement.” 
As previously noted, Schalk’s significance stems from the 
ECtHR’s acknowledgment that Article 8’s family life also applies 
to same-sex partnerships.54 Prior to this decision, the ECtHR 
expressly refused to include same-sex partnerships and their 
families within the scope of this provision, only extending the 
                                                          
52 Id. ¶ 58 (“[T]he institution of marriage has undergone major social 
change since the adoption of the Convention, the Court notes that there is no 
European consensus regarding same-sex marriage.”). 
53 Id. ¶ 60 (Comparing Article 12 with Article 8 does not mean that same-
sex couples should be denied “family life” due to biological sex, but the 
difference in wording between “men and women” and “everyone” is notable to 
withhold an expansive reading of Article 12 to include same-sex couples). 
54 Id.  
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
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right to private life found in Article 8 to same-sex couples.55 By 
expanding family life, the ECtHR fundamentally shifted the 
conversation.  
At the time that the First Section decided Schalk, only 
six of the forty-seven Contracting States of the Council of Europe 
recognized same-sex marriages and only thirteen extended some 
form of partnership reorganization (e.g., civil unions).56 The 
applicants, two cohabitating Austrian nationals in a same-sex 
relationship, claimed that Austria discriminated against them 
when they were denied the right to marry or to have a 
relationship otherwise recognized by law.57 The applicants 
brought their claims under Article 12 and Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8.58 On the issue of admissibility, 
Austria failed to provide a strong argument against the 
complaint as it related to Article 12 of the Convention, which the 
First Section determined was satisfied due to the complex 
nature and the issue of law and fact it raised.59 For the alleged 
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, the 
First Section affirmed admissibility but determined that the 
applicants failed to achieve victim status.60 The reasoning 
                                                          
55 See Mata Estevez, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 321.  
56 Schalk, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 27–28.  
57 Id. ¶¶ 1–3.  
58 Id. ¶¶ 40, 65.  
59 Id. ¶¶ 40–41 (“The Court observes that the Government raised the 
question whether the applicants’ complaint fell within the scope of Article 12, 
given that they were two men claiming the right to marry. The Government 
did not argue, however that the complaint was inadmissible as being 
incompatible ratione materiae. The Court agrees that the issue is sufficiently 
complex not to be susceptible of being resolved at the admissibility stage. The 
Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint 
raises serious issues of fact and of law under the Convention, the 
determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court 
concludes, therefore, that this this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded… 
No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible has been established.”).  
60 Id. ¶¶ 73–74 (“The Court reiterates that an applicant’s status as a 
victim may depend on compensation being awarded at the domestic level on 
the basis of the facts about which he or she complains before the Court and on 
whether the domestic authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in 
substance, the breach of the Convention. … [T]he Court does not have to 
examine whether the first condition has been fulfilled, as the second condition 
has not been met. The government had made it clear that the Registered 
Partnership Act was introduced a matter of policy choice and not in order to 
15
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applied by the First Section portends its ultimate holding: 
Austria did not violate the Convention by failing to extend 
partnership recognition to same-sex couples.61 
The First Section began its assessment on the alleged 
Article 12 complaint by acknowledging its previous movement 
away from the concept of traditional marriage. It cited Goodwin 
as an example of its willingness to interpret Article 12 in light of 
the circumstances that existed at the time of the case.62 Recall 
that in Goodwin, the Grand Chamber acknowledged a 
crystalized consensus among the Contracting States that an 
individual who undergoes sexual-reassignment surgery can 
marry a member of the opposite sex.63 In doing so, the Grand 
Chamber removed the biological aspect of sex from the concept 
of marriage as contemplated by Article 12; this did not mean 
that biological sex was irrelevant, but only that an individual 
who undergoes sex reassignment surgery can participate in 
marriage with a member of the now opposite sex.64 It further 
acknowledged, however, that this did not extend marriage to 
couples in pre-existing marriages when one partner seeks to 
transition to the other sex, which afforded the State the ability 
to force that couple to divorce prior to acknowledging a change 
in sex.65  
The petitioners in Schalk argued that, although Article 
12 contains the words “men and women,” one could read that as 
                                                          
fulfil an obligation under the Convention.”). This note avoided a discussion on 
victim status as understood by the ECtHR as it did not afford any substantive 
value to this analysis. It was included in the analysis of Schalk only because 
of its relation to the final decision.  
61 Schalk, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 110.  
62 Id. ¶ 51.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. ¶ 52 (“[The Court] considered that the terms used by Article 12 
which referred to the right of a man and woman no longer had to be understood 
as determining gender by purely biological criteria.”). This concept is not 
unique to Europe; prior to Obergefell, some U.S. states recognized that 
transgender individuals could marry a member of the opposite gender if they 
had met necessary legal requirements.  
65 Id. ¶ 53 (“The Court concluded that it fell within the State’s margin of 
appreciation as to how to regulate the effects of the change of gender on pre-
existing marriages.”) (citing Parry v. the United Kingdom, 2006-XV Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 271; R. and F. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35748/05, 28 November 2006).  
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
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meaning “two men” or “two women.”66 The First Section 
dismissed this argument by stating that the specific language of 
Article 12, as compared to other Articles, indicates that the 
framers intended to restrict marriage to members of the opposite 
sex.67 In refusing to accept the applicants’ argument, the First 
Section ultimately held that even though the applicants did not 
utilize an entirely textualist argument, even relying on the 
ECtHR’s living instrument doctrine, the light of present day 
circumstances had yet to mean that Article 12 obligates 
Contracting States to extend marriage to same-sex couples.68  
The First Section next addressed the alleged violation of 
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. 
To start the analysis, it acknowledged that established case law 
recognized that family life under Article 8 does not require a 
marriage.69 The ECtHR affords States a wide margin of 
appreciation to define family life because of the lack of common 
ground between the Contracting States. Due to the rapidly 
changing landscape within the Council of Europe, it held that, 
in light of present-day circumstances, a consensus had emerged 
that family life encompasses same-sex couples in de facto 
partnerships.70  
The applicants argued that one may derive a right to 
marriage from taking Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, 
which they supported by reasoning that one must read the 
Convention as a whole and the Articles construed in harmony 
with one another.71 Further, the applicants predicated this 
argument on the notion that the failure to extend marriage 
rights to same-sex couples treated same-sex couples different 
than opposite-sex couples, thus violating Article 12 in 
conjunction with Article 8.72 This argument, however, failed to 
consider the wide margin of appreciation afforded to Contracting 
                                                          
66 Schalk, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 54–55. 
67 Id. ¶¶ 54–55, 60 (holding that because other articles use “everyone” 
while Article 12 uses “men and women,” the wording implies a deliberate 
intent).  
68 Id. ¶ 58. 
69 Id. ¶ 91.  
70 Id. ¶¶ 91, 94. 
71 Schalk, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 101. 
72 Id. ¶ 96.  
17
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States in this circumstance.73 The First Section viewed this 
argument as inherently flawed, stating that if its previous 
holding that Article 12 does not guarantee the right to marry to 
same-sex couples, then Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, 
a broader provision, cannot be interpreted to create an obligation 
either.74   
Further, the First Section determined that a lack of 
consensus still had yet to emerge, as a majority of Contracting 
States had yet to move on the issue of same-sex partnership 
recognition, but it did identify an emerging consensus.75 
Therefore, the First Section found no obligation for Austria to 
provide same-sex couples with access to marriage.76 Finally, the 
First Section concluded that the Contracting States remain free 
to restrict access to marriage and to determine the extent to 
which an alternative scheme confers rights similar to marriage 
to same-sex couples.77  
Schalk may not have extended the right to marriage to 
same-sex couples or created a positive obligation on Contracting 
States to provide an alternative scheme for partnership 
recognition, but it did offer three redeeming aspects: (1) Article 
12 is no longer exclusive to opposite-sex couples in all 
circumstances; (2) it extended the right to family life to same-
sex couples; and (3) it acknowledged an emerging consensus 
among the Contracting States in regards to legal partnership 
recognition for same-sex couples.78  
                                                          
73 Id. ¶¶ 96–98 (Acknowledging a narrow margin of appreciation for 
state regulation on sex and sexual orientation but a broad margin of 
appreciation general measurers of economic and social strategy).  
74 Id.  
75 Id. ¶ 105 (“Nevertheless, there is not yet a majority of States providing 
for legal recognition of same-sex couples. This area in question must therefore 
still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no established consensus, where 
States must also enjoy a margin of appreciation in the timing of the 
introduction of legislative changes.”) (citations omitted). 
76 Id. ¶ 106 (“The Austrian Registered Partnership Act, which came into 
force on 1 January 2010, reflects the evolution described above and is thus part 
of the emerging European consensus. Though not in the vanguard, the 
Austrian legislator cannot be reproached for not having introduced the 
Registered Partnership Act earlier.”).  
77 Id. ¶¶ 108–09.  
78 Loveday Hodson, A Marriage by Any Other Name?, 11 HUM. RIGHTS L. 
REV. 170, 176 (2011) (“[T]he Court acknowledged an emerging European 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
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Three years after the decision in Schalk, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights issued its 
decision in Vallianatos and Others v. Greece.79  Where Schalk 
first extended family life to same-sex couples and began to 
further erode the biological aspect previously incorporated into 
marriage, Vallianatos identified circumstances where a positive 
obligation to provide legal recognition to same-sex couples will 
manifest.  
On November 26, 2008, the “Reforms concerning the 
family, children and society,” which created an alternative 
scheme to marriage restricted only to opposite-sex couples, went 
into effect in Greece.80 An explanatory report justified this law 
by recognizing the social reality of modern Greece–many couples 
wished to have more flexibility in regards to their state-
recognized unions.81 Although some pushed for the inclusion of 
same-sex couples, the legislature felt that Greek society was “not 
yet ready to accept cohabitation between same-sex couples.”82  
The Grand Chamber granted admissibility for two 
reasons: (1) although two of the applicants did not meet the 
criteria, the remaining applicants satisfied the criteria for victim 
status as described in Article 34; and (2) the Government failed 
to show how the applicants could receive sufficient remedy in 
domestic courts or that the applicants failed to exhaust domestic 
remedies.83  
On the merits of the case, the Greek government argued, 
inter alia, that the point of the law was to protect children born 
to different sex couples who were already living in de facto 
partnerships, but that the civil unions were to provide an 
alternative partnership scheme to heterosexual couples who 
wish to have more flexibility relative to marriage.84 The 
government further relied on the claim that the law was justified 
under the existing social phenomenon of opposite-sex couples 
                                                          
consensus towards recognition and indicated that its case law would be 
responsive to it.”).  
79 Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 125.  
80 Id. ¶ 9.  
81 Id. ¶ 10.  
82 Id. ¶¶ 13–14.  
83 Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R ¶¶ 47–59.  
84 Id. ¶ 61.   
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raising children out of wedlock and their interest in protecting 
the legal rights of their families.85 That is, the legislature did not 
intend to regulate all non-married, opposite-sex couples who 
were already offered some de facto rights for their unrecognized 
partnerships, but wanted to offer more protection for those non-
married, opposite-sex couples with children.86 The applicants 
countered that the law was out-of-step with other European 
countries that had introduced civil unions, and that the clear 
intent of the law was to regulate non-married couples who did 
not wish to marry, whether they had, or intended to have, 
children.87   
Previously, the ECtHR refused to include Article 14 of 
the Convention, which contemplates issues related to different 
treatment of individuals, in an analysis concerning same-sex 
families. However, Schalk’s expansive view of family life enabled 
the Grand Chamber to apply Article 14 to same-sex couples and 
narrow the margin of appreciation previously enjoyed by the 
Contracting States when it takes Article 8 in conjunction with 
Article 14.88 One should recall that this is not out-of-step with 
Schalk, as the First Section in Schalk acknowledged the interest 
a same-sex couple has in civil unions, but afforded the State a 
greater margin of appreciation on regulating marriage as 
permitted under Article 12 of the Convention. On this point, the 
Grand Chamber found that the raison d’être of Greece’s action 
was to create an alternative scheme for the purpose of governing 
the contract between two opposite-sex couples for the purpose of 
living as a couple.89 The government did not confine the law only 
to child-rearing, but included regulation on financial relations, 
                                                          
85 Id. ¶ 63.  
86 Id. ¶ 64.  
87 Id. ¶¶ 60–61.  
88 Id. ¶¶ 76–77 (“The notion of discrimination within the meaning of 
Article 14 also includes cases where a person or group is treated, without 
proper justification, less favourably than another, even though the more 
favorable treatment is not called for by the Convention . . . Sexual orientation 
is a concept covered by Article 14. The Court has repeatedly held that, just like 
differences based on sex, differences based on sexual orientation require 
‘particularly convincing and weighty reasons’ by way of justification . . . 
Differences based on sexual orientation are unacceptable under the 
Convention.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
89 Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61.  
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
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maintenance obligations, the right to inherit, and dissolution of 
the union.90 For those reasons, the Grand Chamber did not 
accept the government’s argument that it undertook this action 
due to the interest in children born or raised by an unwed 
couple.91  
Nevertheless, the Grand Chamber held that in this 
context, when the Contracting State has a narrow margin of 
appreciation, the principle of proportionality requires that the 
State only act out of necessity to exclude individuals (or groups) 
from achieving its aim, firmly placing the burden of proof on the 
government to show why exclusion is necessary.92  Applying the 
principle of proportionality to the issue at hand, the Grand 
Chamber once again acknowledged an emerging consensus 
among States for legal recognition of same-sex relationships.93 
However, the consensus that the Grand Chamber did identify 
was based on the fact that of all the Contracting States that 
introduced legal and alternative partnership schemes for unwed 
couples, they all included same-sex couples, with Greece and 
Lithuania serving as the exceptions.94 Hence, the consensus is 
not that one must provide same-sex couples with legal 
partnership recognition, but if a Contracting State chose to 
introduce a scheme for unwed couples, it must include same-sex 
couples.  
The Grand Chamber further noted that Resolution 1728 
(2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
which called on Contracting States to ensure legal recognition of 
same-sex couples and specifically identifying alternative 
schemes for unmarried couples, supported the notion that States 
should include same-sex couples within any alternative 
                                                          
90 Id. 
91 Id. ¶ 89 (“[T]he Court notes firstly that the Government’s arguments 
focus on the situation of different-sex couples with children, without justifying 
the difference in treatment arising out of the legislation in question between 
same-sex and different-sex couples who are not parents. Secondly, the Court is 
not convinced by the Government’s argument that the attainment through 
[the] law . . .  of the goals to which they refer presupposes excluding same-sex 
couples from its scope.”).   
92 Id. ¶ 85.  
93 Id. ¶ 91.  
94 Id.  
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partnership schemes.95 Put another way, the Grand Chamber 
identified an emerged consensus that if a State acts to create an 
alternative scheme that extends to unwed couples the rights 
otherwise reserved for married couples, the Convention places a 
positive obligation on the State to include same-sex couples in 
that scheme. For a State to not include same-sex couples, they 
must have convincing and weighty reasons to justify that 
exclusion.96 Therefore, Greece violated Article 8 taken in 
conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention by excluding same-
sex couples from its civil union law.97  
Vallianatos builds on the foundation of Schalk in a 
significant way- Schalk extended family life to include same-sex 
couples but stopped short of placing a positive obligation on 
Austria to act earlier than it did to extend some legal recognition 
to those couples; Vallianatos, for the first time, identified a 
positive obligation for a State to extend legal recognition to 
same-sex couples, but it does so only if the State chooses to act 
on the issue of legal recognition for unmarried couples. The 
Grand Chamber failed to identify a consensus for providing legal 
recognition, but held that, if a State chooses to create an 
alternative partnership recognition, even if just for opposite-sex 
couples, it must do so inclusive of same-sex couples.98 The 
question now posed focuses on whether Oliari alters this 
understanding.  
II. OLIARI AND OTHERS V. ITALY 
 
The Fourth Section of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Oliari and Others v. Italy held that Italy’s failure to 
extend any legal recognition to same-sex couples violated Article 
8 of the Convention.99 The holding signals a natural progression 
                                                          
95 See Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 61, 28–30; see also id. ¶ 91 
(“[T]his trend is reflected in the relevant Council of Europe materials . . . [T]he 
Court refers particularly to Resolution 1728(2010) of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and to Committee of Ministers 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5.”) (citations omitted). 
96 See Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 92.  
97 Id. ¶¶ 34–35.  
98 This note withheld an analysis of the concurring and dissenting 
opinions as they addressed other issues presented.  
99 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R.¶ 205.  
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
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of ECtHR jurisprudence respective to the rights for homosexuals 
under the ECHR. Nevertheless, Oliari fails to address many of 
the issues facing same-sex families and is narrowly-tailored in 
such a way that it remains seemingly only applicable to the 
circumstances found in Italy.  
 
a. The Relevant Articles of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and 
Admissibility 
 
The applicants in Oliari claimed that the failure on the 
part of the Italian Government (“Italy;” “the Government”) to 
legally recognize same-sex couples violated Article 8 alone, 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, and Article 12 alone, and 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 12.100  
As a threshold matter, the Fourth Section recognized the 
undisputed fact that Article 8’s “private life” contemplates LGB 
individuals; reiterated that Article 8’s “family life” encompasses 
same-sex couples in de facto partnerships; and concluded that 
the facts of the case-at-bar meet the admissibility requirements 
of Article 8.101 Further, as Article 14 serves as a complementary 
provision to the other substantive provisions, and as Italy did 
not contest applicability, because Article 8 applies on its own, 
Article 14 with Article 8 also meets the admissibility 
requirements.102  
In regards to Article 12, the Applicants argued that 
because more countries have legislated in favor of same-sex 
marriage post-Schalk, and because the ECtHR interprets the 
Convention as a living document, the facts of this case warrant 
a reevaluation of the subject matter in light of the present day.103 
While the Fourth Section did determine that Article 12 no longer 
applies exclusively to heterosexual couples, Schalk failed to 
expand Article 12 to include same-sex couples, stating that 
                                                          
100 Id. ¶¶ 99, 188–190.  
101 Id. ¶ 106. Recall that the Court first expanded private life to apply to 
homosexuals in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom and recognized family life to 
include de facto same-sex couples in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria.  
102 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R ¶¶ 102–04. 
103 Id. ¶ 189.  
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although it recognizes an emerging European consensus 
towards legal recognition of same-sex couples, it cannot find a 
crystalized consensus among the Contracting States that would 
place a positive obligation to extend marriage to same-sex 
couples, and that States maintain a broad margin of 
appreciation when it comes to regulating marriage; thus, the 
exclusion of same-sex couples does not offend the Convention.104 
As a consensus had yet to emerge, the Article 12 claim was 
manifestly ill-founded and, therefore, was inadmissible.105   
 
b. The Italian Constitution and Same-Sex 
Partnership Recognition  
 
Prior to taking the case to the ECtHR, the applicants 
sought redress within the domestic court system. The 
Constitutional Court of Italy on April 15, 2010 held that denying 
same-sex couples access to legal recognition and benefits similar 
to marriage violates Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, and 
identified a legal lacuna due to the failure to formally recognize 
any form of same-sex partnerships.106 Nevertheless, the Italian 
Court was powerless to rectify the issue as, by nature of the 
Italian system, it cannot act on its own and it cannot force the 
legislature to act.107  
The Fourth Section noted that the Italian parliament had 
debated the subject matter since 1986.108 In fact, the 
Government referenced this debate as a predicate to its 
argument that Italy acted within its margin of appreciation by 
                                                          
104 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409, ¶¶ 105, 108 
(finding a lack of consensus among contracting stats that would place a positive 
obligation under either Article 12 or Article 8 to extend marriage rights to 
same-sex couples, or to require some form of partnership benefits).  
105 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 192 (at the time of Oliari, only eleven 
states had same-sex marriage); id. ¶ 194. (“It follows that both the complaint[s] 
… are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 
35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.”).  
106 Id. ¶¶ 2–3.  
107 Id. Similarly, the ECtHR cannot force a State to act; it can merely 
find when the State’s action (or inaction) offends a Convention provision and 
issue a fine against that State.  
108 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 126. 
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continuing to debate the subject matter.109 Nevertheless, the 
Government argued that because a consensus had yet to emerge, 
the ECtHR cannot find that it violated Article 8 for failing to 
move on the issue.110 The Fourth Section rejected this argument, 
stating that while domestic governments are usually better 
placed to assess the interest of the community, the fact that the 
Constitutional Court of Italy identified an unconstitutional legal 
lacuna that the legislature must remedy and that this issue had 
been considered by the Italian parliament previously, the 
continued failure of the legislature to move on the subject 
sufficiently demonstrates that Italy violated its margin of 
appreciation within Article 8.111  The Fourth Section further 
observed that providing civil unions was “an expression [that] 
reflects the sentiments of a majority of the Italian population, as 
shown through official surveys.”112  
The Fourth Section further utilized Italy’s long delayed 
action to indicate that it had a positive obligation to act,113 which 
implicates Vallianatos as an indirect analogy. That is to say, in 
Vallianatos, the Greek Government passed an alternative 
scheme to marriage, and the Grand Chamber held that because 
of the strong interest of same-sex couples in legal protections, 
any alternative partnership scheme cannot exclude same-sex 
couples,114 but in Oliari, the fact that Italy had debated this 
issue for decades, and the fact that the Constitutional Court has 
identified that the legal lacuna is unconstitutional, a positive 
obligation can be identified that required Italy to provide 
partnership recognition to same-sex couples.115 In that regard, 
                                                          
109 Id.  
110 Id. 
111 Id. ¶¶ 179–80.  
112 Id. ¶ 181 (“The statistics submitted indicate that there is amongst 
the Italian population a popular acceptance of homosexual couples, as well as 
public support for their recognition and protection.”).  
113 See id. ¶ 166.  
114 Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 47–59. 
115 The ECtHR also identified a decision from the Italian Court of 
Cessasion from 2012, where the Court of Cessasion concluded that foreign 
marriages could not be recognized because that recognition would have no legal 
ramification in Italy, but persons living in a stable relationship were entitled 
to private and family life protections under Article 8 of the Convention; thus, 
the failure on the part of Italy to offer some type of analogous partnership 
25
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the analysis suggests that the Fourth Section did not suddenly 
recognize a new positive obligation, but that it merely expands 
the positive obligation previously identified that manifests when 
the State begins to act. Ultimately, the Fourth Section 
considered: (1) the Italian parliament had debated this issue 
since 1986;116 (2) in 2010 the Constitutional Court identified a 
legal lacuna in denying same-sex couples the right to marry;117 
(3) in 2012 the Court of Cessation found that Italy’s failure to 
offer any legal recognition analogous to marriage likely violates 
the ECHR;118 and (4) the Italian public favored granting same-
sex couples the right to legal recognition.119 The Fourth Section 
used these factors to find that the Parliament was not acting as 
the best arbiter for the desires of the Italian people, and that in 
this instance, the court rulings coupled with opinion polls clearly 
indicated a preference for granting same-sex couples legal 
recognition, thus narrowing Italy’s margin of appreciation.120  
 
a. The Emerging Trend among Contracting 
States  
 
The ECtHR has taken small steps towards recognizing a 
positive obligation under Article 8 requiring legal recognition of 
same-sex couples. As previously discussed, Schalk expanded the 
purview of Article 12 regarding gender, but fell short of finding 
a positive obligation for the recognition of same-sex marriage.121 
By the time Schalk reached the First Section, Austria passed the 
Registered Partnership Act, creating a legal scheme for same-
sex couples to receive similar rights to heterosexual couples. 
This meant that the First Section declined to address whether 
                                                          
scheme contravened the Convention. Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 35. See also 
Sabrina Ragone & Valentina Volpe, An Emerging Right to “Gay” Family Life? 
The case of Oliari v. Italy in a Comparative Perspective, 17 German L.J. 451, 
455–56 (2016) (providing an analysis of the decisions from the Italian 
Constitutional Court and Court of Cessation and their impact on the decision 
of the European Court of Human Rights).  
116 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 126. 
117 Id. ¶¶ 40–41. 
118 Id. ¶ 35.  
119 Id. ¶ 190.  
120 See id. ¶ 59.  
121 See Schalk, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409.  
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Article 8 places a positive obligation on Contracting States to 
extend legal recognition to same-sex couples. The First Section, 
however, held that Austria’s movement on the issue lent itself to 
an emerging consensus for partnership recognition. Hence, 
Austria acted within its margin of appreciation, even if a little 
late to the game.122   
In Vallianatos v. Greece, the Grand Chamber recognized 
a positive obligation under Article 8 to provide legal recognition 
to same-sex couples; it did so under the premise that if the 
Contracting State acts to create an alternative partnership 
scheme relative to marriage, it cannot do so while excluding 
same-sex couples.123 Greece violated Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 8 because the process of recognizing de facto 
cohabitation, and affording those unregistered partnerships 
rights usually reserved for marriage, must not discriminate due 
to sexual orientation.124 Put another way, under Schalk, a 
Contracting State does not have a positive obligation to extend 
marriage to same-sex couples, but under Vallianatos, if they 
choose to create an alternative scheme of partnership 
recognition for non-married couples, they cannot exclude same-
sex couples from the scheme. The logic behind the ECtHR’s 
holding focuses primarily on which emerging consensus applies. 
That is to say, many other Contracting States previously 
introduced some form of alternative to marriage, but in all cases 
except for Greece and Lithuania, those alternatives included 
same-sex partners. Thus, the act of establishing an alternative 
scheme to marriage became the consensus the ECtHR identified, 
and that action created a positive obligation to include same-sex 
couples.125  
                                                          
122 Id. ¶ 105; see also id. ¶ 106 (“Though not in the vanguard, the 
Austrian legislation cannot be reproached for not having introduced the 
Registered Partnership Act any earlier.”).  
123 See Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
124 See Id. ¶ 89.  
125 Id. ¶ 91 (“[T]he Court would point to the fact that, although there is 
no consensus among the legal systems of ... member States, a trend is currently 
emerging with regard to the introduction of forms of legal recognition of same-
sex relationships. Nine member States provide same-sex marriage. In addition, 
seventeen member States authorise some form of civil partnership for same-
sex couples. As to the specific issue raised by the present case, the Court 
considers that the trend emerging in the legal systems of the ... member States 
27
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One must consider the distinction between Vallianatos 
and Oliari. Following the logic in Vallianatos, a positive 
obligation manifests when the Contracting State chooses to act. 
In a sense, this creates a negative obligation to simply not act if 
a Contracting State wishes to remain within the margin of 
appreciation for not extending any legal recognition to same-sex 
couples. In Oliari, however, the applicants claim that by not 
establishing civil unions (or marriage), the Contracting State 
violated the Convention. Considering the short time between 
Vallianatos and Oliari, the number of States recognizing some 
form of partnership recognition remained relatively stable.126 
Oliari did not move the issue substantially, but expanded the 
type of state action that constitutes movement: in Vallianatos, 
the action of the Greek government and the resulting alternative 
partnership scheme created the positive obligation; in Oliari, the 
action by the Italian government, in debating partnership 
recognition for three decades, the unconstitutional lacuna 
identified by the Italian Constitutional Court, and the 
Parliament’s failure to act, created the positive obligation. 
Hence, Oliari broadens the consensus by including movement by 
the government, not that it necessarily requires an actual 
alternative scheme to have been implemented. Further, it 
indicates what “movement” may mean. 
 The Fourth Section emphasized developments outside of 
the Council of Europe. For instance, the decision acknowledged 
that the Supreme Court of the United States recognized a 
constitutional right to marriage for same-sex couples in 
                                                          
is clear: of the nineteen States which authorize some form of registered 
partnership other than marriage, Lithuania and Greece are the only ones to 
reserve it exclusively to different-sex couples. In other words, with two 
exceptions ... when they opt to enact legislation introducing a new system of 
registered partnership as an alternative to marriage for unmarried couples, 
include same-sex couples in its scope.”). But see Clair Poppelwell-Scevak, The 
Euroepan Court of Human Rights and Same-Sex Marriage. The Consensus 
Approach 41–45 (Ohio Law School, PluriCourts Research Paper No. 16–10, 
2016) (arguing there continues to be confusion among scholars on what an 
emerging consensus is, and using trend in place of emerging consensus more 
aptly describes the process of the Court as it relates to LGBTQI rights), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2832756.    
126 See Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 9; see also Oliari, 2015 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. ¶ 205.  
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Obergefell v. Hodges.127 But the Fourth Section implied that the 
Supreme Court reached this decision by undertaking a 
consensus analysis because it only found that same-sex 
marriage was a right after most States permitted it.128 Under 
this logic, had a majority of states not expanded marriage rights 
to same-sex couples, the Supreme Court may have found 
differently.129 This implication seeks to legitimatize the ECtHR’s 
reluctance on the issue.  
 
a. The Concurring Opinion  
 
Three judges concurred that Italy did violate Article 8 of 
the Convention, but did not find that the Convention imposed a 
positive obligation on States to act.130 They reasoned that by 
acting voluntarily, Italy chose to intervene in the personal 
relations of homosexuals, as understood by Article 8, and that 
action triggered a positive obligation.131 The violation finds its 
root in the defective nature of the Italian system, in that the 
Constitutional Court has the power to interpret the Italian 
Constitution but does not have the power to enforce its 
holding.132  
The Concurrence noted that the Majority’s opinion 
applied a narrow application of the doctrines in circumstances 
                                                          
127 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R.  ¶ 65, citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 
2584 (2015) (recognizing a fundamental right under the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment for same-sex couples to marry).  
128 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 65 (“[N]oting that many States already allowed 
same-sex marriage ... [the Supreme Court] opined that the disruption caused 
by the recognition bans was significant and ever-growing.”). 
129 In that sense, had the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the issue 
earlier, it would have not reached the conclusion that it did, or U.S. states 
would maintain a broader margin of appreciation in regards to their respective 
marriage laws. This supports the notion that the ECtHR’s concern for 
legitimacy impacts its willingness to move on an issue; the consensus analysis 
doctrine inhibits the ability of the ECtHR to evolve. However, one should not 
disregard the tremendous steps made by the ECtHR to protect minority rights. 
When the ECtHR decided Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, it did so in the 
vanguard. Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy would cite Dudegon in 2003 in 
Lawrence v. Texas, which overturned anti-sodomy laws in the United States.  
130 Oliari 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 1 (Mahoney, concurring). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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unique to Italy.133 It reasoned that the Majority is “careful to 
limit their finding … to Italy and to ground their conclusion on 
a combination of factors not necessarily found in other 
Contracting States … [W]e are not sure that such a limitation of 
a positive obligation under the Convention to local conditions is 
conceptually possible.”134 Thus, the positive obligation only 
applies to Italy. However, whether it is feasible to so narrowly 
limit the positive obligation to one State remains 
undetermined.135 Furthermore, the Concurrence spoke to the 
misapplication in the Majority’s use of positive obligation.136 
That is, the Majority suggested a positive obligation on all 
Contracting States, but that should not apply to all Contracting 
States; rather, the defect here cannot be found in the terms of a 
failure to fulfill a positive obligation, but in defective State 
intervention in the sphere of private and family life.137  
 
c. What does Oliari Accomplish?  
 
Oliari may not accomplish anything in the immediate 
future. The decision does identify some key issues that 
proponents of same-sex marriage, or civil unions, must address 
prior to any further movement within the scope of the Council of 
Europe. But the holding remains firmly narrow and still in line 
with Vallianatos and Schalk.  
                                                          
133 Id. ¶ 9 (Mahoney, concurring). 
134 Id. ¶ 10 (“Our colleagues are careful to limit their finding ... to Italy 
and to ground their conclusion on a combination of factors not necessarily 
found in other Contracting States. [W]e are not sure that such a limitation of 
a positive obligation under the Convention to local conditions is conceptually 
possible.”) (concurring opinion). 
135 Id. (concurring opinion). 
136 Id. (concurring opinion). 
137 Id. ¶ 10. The note offers that one can interpret the differences as 
highly nuanced, and they seem prima facie identical. The Majority finds a 
positive obligation when the Government moves on the issue, with Oliari 
expanding what qualifies as movement. The Concurrence places the issue on 
Italy’s interference with private and family life. In essence, ‘movement’ and 
‘interference’ are the same thing. The disagreement, however, is whether it 
was appropriate to use this instance to expand what ‘movement’ means. I offer 
that I am partial to the argument put forward by the Concurrence, on the 
ground that it implies progress on the issue when none really exists.  
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4
VITO J MARZANO - OLIARI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2017  2:27 PM 
280 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 29:1 
The Fourth Section based its position on the fact that the 
Government failed to present an argument that it has a 
prevailing community interest in restricting access of 
partnership recognition to same-sex couples.138 The Fourth 
Section acknowledged that Contracting States maintain a wide 
margin of appreciation within the context of private life when a 
consensus among Contracting States within the Council of 
Europe has yet to crystalize.139 The flexible margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by Contracting States depends entirely on 
the positive obligation found under Article 8; that is, when 
determining if such an obligation exists, the ECtHR will utilize 
the fair balancing test, weighing the general interest against the 
interest of the individual.140 The Fourth Section identified the 
individual interest argued by the applicants, that there is a 
particular interest in obtaining civil unions, as this is an 
appropriate alternative to marriage and functions as a way to 
grant legal protections enjoyed by heterosexual couples.141 The 
Fourth Section noted that the Italian Government did not 
present an explicit interest of the community as a whole to 
justify its failure to extend partnership benefits to same-sex 
couples.142  
The Court identified that social and ethical sensitivities 
create a broad margin of appreciation, but noted that the instant 
case lacks such sensitivity.143 The case addresses the need for 
individuals to have access to legal protections and the core 
protections that applicants desire as same-sex couples.144 Thus, 
while social and ethical sensitivities may exist, and may remain 
                                                          
138 Id. ¶ 181.  
139 Id. ¶ 162. I emphasize the usage of the Council of Europe. This 
indicates that the movement must be virtually entirely internal, as unless 
some seismic shift occurs externally that places the Council of Europe in a 
vacuum, the member States must move the Court. 
140 See JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 7, at 96 
(quoting Van Kück v. Germany, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 70-71); see also Oliari, 
2015 Eur. Ct. H.R.  ¶ 162 (“There will also usually be a wide margin if the State 
is required to strike a balance between competing private and public interests 
or Convention rights.”).  
141 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 174.  
142 Id. ¶ 176.  
143 Id. ¶ 111.   
144 Id. ¶ 177. 
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a concern for the State, those sensitivities do not overcome the 
individual interest in seeking legal protections.145  
Ultimately, the logical interpretation follows along with 
Vallianatos, in that the Italian parliament began to act on the 
subject in 1986 and its courts acted as recently as 2010, but legal 
recognition for same-sex couples remained in a state of limbo, as 
in Greece where the Government acted to extend rights to 
heterosexual couples in de facto unions while actively excluding 
same-sex couples.146 In both of the instances, the fact that the 
State committed an action created the positive obligation. In 
Schalk, the First Section did not address the issue of civil unions 
because the legislature acted prior to the any action by the 
Court, thus rending any action moot.147  In this sense, Oliari only 
maintains the status quo and does not expand the rights of 
same-sex couples. However, one can distinguish Oliari from 
Vallianatos in a clear fashion: where in Vallianatos it was 
Greece’s choice to discriminate against same-sex couples in its 
alternative partnership scheme, in Oliari, it was the failure of 
the parliament to act within the desire of the Italian population 
after a legal lacuna had been identified, thereby temporarily 
removing the Parliament from its responsibility as an arbiter. In 
that sense, Oliari may provide a framework for when the ECtHR 
will not pay deference to a choice by the Contracting State’s 
legislature to withhold legal benefits from same-sex couples.  
 
e. Reactions to Oliari  
 
Oliari has received mixed reactions.148 One report noted 
the shortcomings of the decision, acknowledging that the ECtHR 
suggested the predicate factor for such an obligation remains on 
                                                          
145 Id. ¶ 123. 
146 See generally Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 125.  
147 See generally Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409. 
148 Giuseppe Zago, A Victory for Italian Same-Sex Couples, A Victory for 
European Homosexuals? A Commentary on Oliari v Italy 6, (Leiden Law 
School, Article 29, 2015). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2689060 (“[T]he Chamber 
did not make explicit whether the obligation to introduce a legal framework for 
homosexual couples has to be referred merely to the specific Italian situation, 
or if the Court intended to assert a more general principle, as it seems from 
the reading of some passages in the judgment.”).  
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the general acceptance of Italian society.149 Paul Johnson viewed 
Oliari as a groundbreaking judgment, recognizing that while the 
facts are unique to Italy, the establishment of a positive 
obligation for legal recognition where no other action had been 
taken by the Contracting State is a momentous step forward.150 
However, one reaction questioned whether the ECtHR will 
recognize that other Contracting States have a positive 
obligation to provide same-sex partnership recognition, and if 
such an obligation were found, would the more conservative 
Contracting States of the Council of Europe adhere to the 
Court’s decision?151  
Ultimately, the ramifications of Oliari remain 
unresolved. The ECtHR has not clearly determined whether 
Article 8 creates a positive obligation for recognition of same-sex 
                                                          
149 Peter Laverack, Olari v. Italy: a missed opportunity for equality in 
Strasbourg, LSE HUMAN RIGHTS (July 31, 2015), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk 
/humanrights/2015/07/31/oliari-v-italy-a-missed-opportunity-for-equality-in-
strasbourg/ (“More concerning still, the decision to grant civil partnership, as 
opposed to nothing at all, was premised on the general acceptance of the same-
sex relationships within Italian society. Those who wish to keep LGBT people 
in the shadows will no doubt seize upon this. The Starsbourg Court is simply 
wrong to link rights with acceptance.”).  
150 Paul Johnson, Ground-breaking judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Oliari and Others v Italy: same-sex couples in Italy must have 
access to civil unions/registered partnerships, ECHR SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
BLOG, (July 21, 2015 4:15 PM), http://echrso.blogspot.com/2015/07/ground-
breaking-judgment-of-european.html (“This is a ground-breaking judgment 
that advances the human rights and freedoms of same-sex couples in 
significant ways. It establishes that there is a positive obligation for Italy 
under Article 8 to provide same-sex couples with some form of legal recognition 
of their relationships. Although this positive obligation has been established in 
the context of the social and legal relations of Italy, it is clear that this may set 
an important precedent in respect of all other states.”).  
151 Edward Delman, An Ambiguous Victory for Gay Rights in Europe, 
ATLANTIC, July 24, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 
archive/2015/07/gay-rights-italy-europe/399572/ (“The reality is that if the 
ECtHR were, in the future, to order Russia to recognize same-sex unions, it 
would have no surefire way of enforcing that judgment. The Committee of 
Ministers cannot apply sanctions or similar penalties to ensure compliance; it 
can only apply continuous diplomatic pressure on a given member ... But 
pressure can only go so far, and short of expelling a state from the court, there 
is little the ECtHR can do to require a nation to adopt measures that are 
anathema to it.”).  
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couples. It has signaled to Contracting States its intention and 
possible desire to recognize a right to partnership recognition.  
 
III. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND 
POSSIBLE SIGNALS OF THE COURT 
 
The ECtHR did not break new ground with its decision 
in Oliari, Rather, it merely expanded on its previous rulings in 
Schalk and Vallianatos. The impact of these cases on Greece and 
Italy may provide some insight as to the ECtHR’s method. 
Schalk’s importance focuses on the incorporation of same-sex 
individuals into family life under Article 8. That significant shift 
narrowed the margin of appreciation previously enjoyed by 
Contracting States. Further, the wording portends its 
willingness to find a positive obligation on States but failed to 
provide what the criteria of such an obligation are.  
In the two subsequent cases, the ECtHR offered further 
insight. The Council of Europe finds itself in the same situation 
post-Schalk as it did pre-Schalk – no positive obligation exists to 
confer legal recognition to same-sex couples. However, the 
ECtHR provided some recourse to same-sex couples. It 
acknowledged that same-sex couples have an interest in 
securing legal rights and partnership recognition and that 
interest narrows the margin of appreciation to such an extent 
that a State must include same-sex couples in an alternative 
partnership scheme if it chooses to act.152 A clear majority of the 
Contracting States Council of Europe have not created these 
schemes but of the States that have, by a margin of 17-2, same-
sex couples were included.153 That, along with other 
developments in the form of recommendations and resolutions, 
provided enough factors for the ECtHR to place a positive 
obligation on Contracting States who chose to create alternative 
partnership schemes to do so with certain conditions.  
The ECtHR presents States with two options: (1) if they 
choose to provide legal recognition to non-married heterosexual 
                                                          
152 Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 90 (“[S]ame-sex couples would 
have a particular interest in entering into a civil union since it would afford 
them, unlike different-sex couples, the sole basis in … law on which to have 
their relationship legally recognized”).  
153 Id. ¶¶ 91–92.  
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couples, they must also do so for same-sex couples; or (2) not 
move at all on the issue and not run the risk of violating the 
Convention. However, the concept of movement has been 
expanded to include judicial intervention. The Fourth Section in 
Oliari did not find a positive obligation because the legislature 
failed to include same-sex couples, but because Italy’s judiciary 
had identified an unconstitutional legal lacuna, the legislature 
debated the issue for years and failed to act, and a clear majority 
of Italian citizens favored such unions.154 In that regard, the 
Fourth Section recognized that the Italian judiciary became the 
arbiter on the issue, and it was their movement that created the 
positive obligation.155 The point is that there was movement on 
which the ECtHR could find a violation.  
Greece finally addressed same-sex civil unions in 2015, 
when it enacted a human rights bill extending civil unions to 
same-sex couples.156 Not included in that legislation were 
pension benefits, tax and health rights, and adoption rights.157 
Although fairly limited, this may not violate the Convention. 
The First Section held in Schalk, and has not subsequently 
addressed this issue, that Contracting States continue to enjoy 
a wide margin of appreciation on how these alternative 
partnerships take form and the rights they confer.158  Schalk had 
different circumstances than Oliari and Vallianatos, in that the 
applicants in Schalk further claimed that the Austrian 
partnership scheme was insufficient and inferior to the rights 
enjoyed by heterosexual married couples.159 This situation did 
not present itself in Oliari and Vallianatos.  
                                                          
154 Id. ¶ 176.  
155 Id. ¶ 185.  
156 Greece passes bill allowing civil partnerships for same-sex couples, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015 
/dec/ 23/greece-passes-bill-allowing-same-sex-civil-partnerships.  
157 Id.  
158 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 109, (“On the whole, the Court does not see 
any indication that the respondent State [Austria] exceeded its margin of 
appreciation in tis choice of rights and obligations conferred by registered 
partnership.”).  
159 Id. ¶ 23.  
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Italy fulfilled its obligation by passing civil unions for 
same-sex couples on May 11, 2016.160 Although this provides 
needed legal protections for same-sex couples, many LGB claim 
that the legislation falls too short, in that it does not expand 
marriage to same-sex couples and is woefully deficient in the 
rights it confers (i.e., the right to adopt a partner’s children).161 
While the original bill did provide broader protections, the 
pushback from conservative elements of Italian society, namely 
the Catholic Church, required the Government to pass a less 
ambitious bill.162 
Ultimately, the ECtHR signaled its willingness to 
recognize a positive obligation for civil unions. It continues to 
wait for a consensus to emerge that would allow it to find a 
positive obligation to recognize same-sex unions. The probability 
of that within the foreseeable future remains highly unlikely. 
Many Contracting States of the European Union continue to 
express disapproval of LGB individuals and their rights, 
including same-sex marriage.163 Likely, that number increases 
when one includes the Council of Europe. Thus, absent some 
other development, the ECtHR is highly unlikely to find a 
positive obligation to provide civil unions without any movement 
or to find a consensus has emerged to extend marriage to same-
sex couples.  
The ECtHR may seek to identify a consensus over the 
types of rights conferred to same-sex couples. For instance, if a 
majority of states were to include adoption, tax, or inheritance 
rights in their civil union statutes, the ECtHR may find that a 
                                                          
160 Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Approves Same-Sex Civil Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/world/europe/italy-
gay-same-sex-unions.html?_r=0.  
161 Id.  
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State who does not extend these rights is in violation of the 
Convention. However, the current situation does not lend itself 
to any further substantial development on the issue.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Oliari provides more definition to which movement the 
ECtHR may consider when confronted by an applicant seeking 
legal partnership rights for same-sex couples. The ECtHR 
expanded Vallianatos by including judicial action in conjunction 
with national sentiment to determine whether the failure of the 
Contracting State to provide partnership recognition violated 
the Convention. While the ECtHR usually defers to a State’s 
legislature to represent the consensus of the population, such as 
in Italy, it will identify circumstances where legislature has 
failed in that role. Nevertheless, it also implicitly indicated that 
same-sex marriage advocates have a tremendous amount of 
work to do before it will expand the purview of Article 12. But it 
goes a step further, and makes it clear that even finding a broad 
positive obligation under Article 8 for civil unions still requires 
a lot of work. In that sense, the ECtHR demonstrated that, 
although it may want to find in favor of same-sex civil rights, 
concerns with implementation and legitimacy ultimately 
prevail. Put another way, the conservative elements of the 
Council of Europe bind the ECtHR. It will not act without 
certainty when it comes to rights of same-sex couples. Oliari is 
important, but for the wrong reasons. 
From a pragmatic lens, Oliari functions as a step forward 
on the issue. But it does not go far enough. If the ECtHR felt it 
was necessary to limit its holding, it could have further clarified 
which rights partnership recognition must encompass. Here, 
same-sex couples remain unsure of the rights the State must 
provide, if it chooses to act. Instead, the ECtHR will require more 
action on the part of applicants to argue for each right as the 
issue arises. Finally, the ECtHR leaves same-sex couples in 
many Central and Eastern European states without any legal 
protections, and continues to countenance state-sponsored 
discrimination.  
Ultimately, the ECtHR will likely do exactly what was 
discussed above, but in an ad hoc fashion. Instead of addressing 
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this aspect in one holding, it will likely require each individual 
right to come before the ECtHR, thus allowing it to limit its 
holding to more LGB-friendly States. In terms of a broad positive 
obligation under Article 12, the ECtHR is nowhere in the realm 
of imposing such a broad right on the Contracting States. It 
remains much too concerned with the homophobic elements of 
Eastern Europe.  
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